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I. INTRODUCTION
In the Spring of 1995, the Nebraska Legislature passed a statutory
procedure to protect the validity of adoptions in Nebraska. This proce-
dure broke new ground in balancing the interests and rights of puta-
tive fathers with the predominate concern for legal stability in all
adoptive placements. The former version of Nebraska's law required
an unwed father to claim paternity within five days of the birth of his
child.' Unfortunately, the law gave little protection to a father who
did not know of his child's birth or the biological mother's adoption
plan. As a result, the Nebraska Supreme Court warned in dicta that
the five-day filing provision could be "constitutionally suspect" for fail-
ing to provide at least some degree of notice to a father that his poten-
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tial parental rights could end with an adoptive placement of the child
by the biological mother.2
After Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Services Bureau, Inc., adoptive
parents, birth mothers, and their children began placing less trust in
the legal finality of adoptions when the birth father was unaware of
the child's birth or the mother's plan to place the child for adoption.
Practitioners who dealt with adoption cases began formulating their
own makeshift procedures to notify birth fathers, but there was no
consistency among these practices. No one could be sure how much
notice-or even what kind of notice-was sufficient to pass constitu-
tional scrutiny.
One year after Shoecraft, the court held the five-day filing statute
unconstitutional in In re S.R.S.3 In that case, an adopted child in Ne-
braska had his placement disrupted after he had lived with his adop-
tive family for four years.4 The court found the five-day filing
provision of section 43-104 unconstitutional because it failed to ad-
dress the issue of notice and overall failed to provide a suitable proce-
dural framework to handle adoptions involving older children.5
Responding to the court's decision, the Nebraska Legislature moved to
change the statutory rights of unwed fathers in the context of adop-
tions involving both infants and older children.
This Article will examine the history of unwed fathers' rights in
adoption as set forth by the United States Supreme Court and the Ne-
braska Supreme Court. This Article also will identify and discuss the
changes L.B. 712 made in Nebraska law and how those changes im-
proved the validity of Nebraska adoptions. Finally, this Article will
analyze United States Supreme Court and Nebraska Supreme Court
decisions reached after L.B. 712 went into effect in September 1995.
Ultimately, this Article concludes that L.B. 712 and its related provi-
sions can withstand both a due process and equal protection challenge
under the reasoning and analysis employed by the courts at this time.
II. HISTORY
A. Review of United States Supreme Court Cases
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that unwed fa-
thers have certain, albeit limited, potential parental rights when their
minor children are placed for adoption.6 For example, in Stanley v.
2. See Shoecraft v. Catholic Soc. Servs. Bureau, Inc., 222 Neb. 574, 578, 385 N.W.2d
448, 451 (1986).
3. In re S.R.S., 225 Neb. 759, 769, 408 N.W.2d 272, 278-79 (1987).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S.
380 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 245 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972).
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Illinois,7 the unwed father had lived with his three children and their
mother sporadically for eighteen years, but failed to claim paternity
under the procedures set forth under Illinois law. When the mother
died, the state appointed guardians for the children.
The Stanley Court refused to deny the father's parental rights in
the first instance and instead ordered the lower court to determine the
father's parental fitness, ruling that putative fathers have a right to a
hearing on their custodial claims.8 According to Stanley, an unwed
father possesses certain constitutional protections in relation to the
custody of his children.9 The Court further held that an unwed father
deserved notice and a hearing in regard to an adoption and custody
proceeding involving his children.lO The Court's ruling, while afford-
ing some protections to unwed fathers, neither specifically stated
those protections nor outlined a procedure to test a father's parental
fitness. After Stanley, it appeared only that an unwed father deserved
some kind of notice and some kind of hearing on his parental fitness.
Six years later, in Quilloin v. Walcott,"1 the Supreme Court again
considered unwed fathers' rights, this time emphasizing the difference
between an uninvolved biological father and a nurturing, supportive
father. In Quilloin, the mother and father had never married or lived
together. Instead, the mother married another man when the child
was two years old. The child's father visited infrequently and rarely
provided any financial or emotional support. The mother consented to
the child's adoption by her husband when the child was eleven years
old. The biological father objected when he learned of the pending
adoption.
The issue decided in Quilloin was whether, as the biological father
claimed, an unwed father had the same absolute veto power regarding
the adoption of his child as a married or divorced father possessed.
Because he had not nurtured or supported the child, Quilloin ruled
that "in the best interests of the child," the father could not veto the
adoption.12 According to Quilloin, the rights of an unwed father were
"readily distinguishable from those of a separated or divorced
father."13
A few years after Quilloin, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its prior
approach when it again ruled in Caban v. Mohammed that once a fa-
ther establishes a relationship with his children and takes an active
role in supporting them, a state cannot summarily deny the father's
7. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
8. Id. at 658.
9. Id. at 657 n.9.
10. Id.
11. 434 U.S. 245 (1978).
12. Id. at 255.
13. Id. at 256.
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power to veto an adoption.' 4 In Caban, the father had lived with his
children and their mother for two years before the father and mother
separated. Caban emphasized this support and relationship in decid-
ing that the New York statute could not deny the father an opportu-
nity to object to the adoption of his children by another man.1 5
By 1983, when the Court heard Lehr v. Robinson,16 it found a fac-
tual scenario involving unwed parents that differed from the cases the
Supreme Court had heard previously. Unlike Quilloin and Caban, the
father in Lehr had no opportunity to establish any kind of relationship
with his child or to provide any financial support. While the father
and mother lived together for a time prior to her pregnancy, the
mother concealed the birth of their child for two years. When the fa-
ther finally found out about his child, the mother refused his attempts
to provide support. The mother's husband attempted to adopt the
child at about the same time the biological father asked for a determi-
nation of paternity. Later claiming he had not been aware of the
pending adoption at the time he questioned paternity, the biological
father protested the adoption. After the county court granted the
adoption, the biological father appealed.
Lehr ruled that the "mere existence of a biological link does not
merit equivalent constitutional protection" to an unwed father as to a
married, separated, or divorced father.17 The Court noted that the
father had failed to establish significant personal or custodial relation-
ships with the child.i8 Consequently, the Court considered only
whether the state statute protected the father's opportunity to form
such relationships.19 In the Court's view, the state statute provided
for such opportunity.2 0 The Court held, however, that if the statutory
scheme "was likely to omit many responsible fathers and, if qualifica-
tions for notice were beyond the control of an interested putative fa-
ther, it might be procedurally inadequate."21
Through Stanley, Quilloin, Caban, and Lehr, the United States
Supreme Court partially clarified unwed fathers' rights in relation to
the adoption of their toddler-aged and older children. Uncertainly
still lies, however, in adoption scenarios in which the child is an infant
at the time of the adoptive placement. An unwed father has little or
no opportunity to establish the type of relationship that justifies giv-
ing the father a voice in the adoption of his child. This "gap" in the
legal parameters surrounding adoption creates difficulty for attorneys,
14. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979).
15. Id. at 393.
16. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
17. Id. at 261.
18. Id. at 262.
19. Id. at 262-63.
20. Id. at 265.
21. Id. at 263-64.
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agencies, and biological and adoptive families because there are few
clear standards governing adoptions involving newborns and infants,
and these form the majority of adoptive placements each year.
B. Review of Nebraska Supreme Court Cases
In the mid-1970s, in the wake of Stanley v. Illinois, the earliest
United States Supreme Court decision on unwed father's rights, the
Nebraska Legislature passed section 43-104, which gave a biological
father up to five days after the birth of his child to file a form with the
Department of Social Services claiming paternity and asserting his
rights to the child. If the biological father failed to meet the five-day
deadline (he could file anytime during the pregnancy as well), he lost
his right to object to the adoptive placement of his child. The statute
had no requirement that the birth father be notified of the existence of
his child or the adoption plan.
The Nebraska Supreme Court decided two cases construing the
original five-day filing statute, reaching different conclusions in each.
First, in Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Services Bureau, Inc. ,22 the birth
father had knowledge of the impending adoption of his child, but
failed to claim paternity until nine days after the child's birth. The
Shoecraft court upheld the five-day filing statute as applied to the par-
ticular unwed father in that case because he had not supported the
birth mother during her pregnancy, and he had failed to comply with
the statutory deadline despite his knowledge of the birth and the
planned adoptive placement. 23 The court upheld the deadline for fil-
ing five days after the child's birth and held the statute constitu-
tional.24 The court reasoned that the Legislature had assumed a
mother's average hospital stay was about five days and concluded that
the five-day limit furthered the legislative intent for expediency in
adoption proceedings.2 5
Shoecraft correctly applied the statute in effect at the time, yet the
statute's underlying deficiencies were revealed within the court's anal-
ysis. The court noted that the five-day filing statute might be
"render[ed] constitutionally suspect as violative of due process" in a
case in which a biological father is not given notice of the adoption.2 6
Yet the court in Shoecraft found that the statute was constitutional as
applied to the particular biological father because the father had
knowledge of both the pregnancy and the proposed adoption.2 7 The
22. 222 Neb. 574, 385 N.W.2d 448 (1986).
23. Id. at 578, 385 N.W.2d at 451.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 579, 385 N.W.2d at 452 (citing Hearing on L.B. 224 Before Neb. Judiciary
Comm., 84th Legis., 1st Sess. 2 (Neb. 1975)(statement of Sen. Anderson)).
26. Id. at 578, 385 N.W.2d at 451.
27. Id.
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court provided no further guidance, however, concerning which biolog-
ical fathers should receive notice, how or when they should receive
notice, or what impact a preexisting parental relationship between a
biological father and child might have not only on the right to notice,
but ultimately on the constitutionality of the five-day filing statute.
Those questions were partially answered in In re S.R.S.,2s in which
an unwed father had a relationship with his child and somewhat aided
in financial support for the child. In S.R.S., the court declared the
five-day filing statute unconstitutional as applied to the particular bio-
logical father.29 In contrast to the facts in Shoecraft,30 the biological
father in S.R.S. had lived with and helped to support his child for ap-
proximately nineteen months after the child was born. At that point,
the mother moved out with the child and lived with another man. She
refused to inform the father of his child's location. When the child was
two years old, the mother, despite her knowledge of the father's wish
for custody, placed the child for adoption. Shortly thereafter, the child
was placed with a prospective adoptive family.
As soon as the father learned of the adoption proceeding, he filed
an intent to claim paternity, but obviously had missed the five-day
filing deadline. Despite knowledge of the filing, the adoptive family
and adoption agency continued with the adoption. The county court
then issued a decree of adoption after the statutory six-month waiting
period, concluding that the biological father had abandoned the child.
The Nebraska Supreme Court overturned the adoption because the
facts failed to show that the father had abandoned the child and fur-
ther held the five-day filing requirement unconstitutional as applied
to the father in S.R.S.31 The tragic circumstance of S.R.S. was under-
scored by the fact the child had lived with the adoptive family for more
than two years, making him four years old by the time the adoption
was reversed. In re S.R.S., more than any other case, illustrated the
need for adoption reform to better insure legal stability for Nebraska's
adopted children. Nevertheless, adoption reform would not come for
another eight years.
In the interim, adoption practitioners searched for ways to synthe-
size Shoecraft and S.R.S. to better interpret the status of unwed fa-
thers' rights in Nebraska. Both cases held that the "relationship
between a parent and child is constitutionally protected" under the
Bill of Rights, Article IX of the of the United States Constitution.3 2
Yet, the differences between the two cases blurred the line between
what was constitutional and unconstitutional, leaving significant
28. 225 Neb. 759, 408 N.W.2d 272 (1987).
29. Id. at 769, 408 N.W.2d at 279.
30. See supra text accompanying notes 21-23.
31. In re S.R.S., 225 Neb. 759, 769, 408 N.W.2d 272, 279 (1987).
32. Id. at 767, 408 N.W.2d at 277.
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questions as to whether the five-day filing statute could survive with-
out revision. For example, the In re S.R.S. court ruled that because
the father had established a relationship with his child, no compelling
interest would be served by allowing the mother "to singlehandedly
sever a relationship between a father and child."33 Yet, the court sev-
ered the biological father's parental rights in Shoecraft because the
father had not established a relationship with his child despite his
lack of opportunity to establish such a relationship. Both fathers had
notice of the child's existence; neither filed an intent to claim paternity
within five days of the birth; yet, one lost the opportunity to parent
and one did not.
After Shoecraft, In re S.R.S., and the prior United States Supreme
Court cases, Nebraska attorneys and agencies were left to try to inter-
pret what protection needed to be afforded an unwed father to com-
plete a valid and legally stable adoptive placement. Adoption reform
became necessary because it was nearly impossible to know in ad-
vance whether a particular adoption scenario was a "Shoecraft" case-
a scenario in which the parties could rely on the five-day filing re-
quirement-or an "S.R.S." case-a scenario in which the five-day fil-
ing requirement would be disregarded. The problem was no one knew
what procedures had to be followed if the five-day filing statute was
inapplicable.
This uncertainty and the consequent level of concern within the
adoption community was only heightened by the well-publicized "Baby
Jessica" case in Iowa. 34 After "Baby Jessica," the Nebraska Legisla-
ture realized, as did the adoption community, that if statutory proce-
dures remained unchanged, the courts likely would overturn adoptive
placements and remove children-even happy two-year-olds-from
their adoptive homes. The Legislature's response came in the form of
L.B. 712, enacted September 7, 1995.
III. L.B. 712
Senator Gerald Matzke introduced L.B. 712 not as legislation in-
tended to promote birth fathers' rights, but rather as an act to
strengthen the validity of adoptions in Nebraska.35 The intent of L.B.
712 was to provide an adoption process that would adequately address
an unwed father's rights as early in the adoption process as possible to
promote finality in the placement. The aspirational goal was to ascer-
tain the status of the birth father's rights before the child was placed
33. Id. at 769, 408 N.W.2d at 278.
34. In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993).
35. Hearing on L.B. 712 Before Neb. Comm. on Health and Human Servs., 94th
Legis., 1st Sess. 2 (Neb. 1995)(statement of Sen. Matzke).
[Vol. 76:856
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in an adoptive home and in all cases before the adoption decree was
entered and deemed final.36
A. What L.B. 712 Did
In passing L.B. 712, the Legislature did not replace the statutory
five-day filing deadline; rather, L.B. 712 made additions to enhance
the existing law. Legislators attempted to strengthen the statute's
constitutional foundation to enable the statute to withstand an unwed
father's due process challenge regardless of the unique facts presented
in a particular adoption scenario. The Bill tried to stabilize the legal-
ity of Nebraska adoptions by including a series of steps to identify the
birth father's rights earlier in the adoption process. In actuality, L.B.
712 did little more than codify what many agencies and practicing at-
torneys were already doing in terms of notifying birth fathers. To im-
prove finality of adoption, agencies and attorneys attempted to make
each case as factually similar to Shoecraft as possible so the birth fa-
ther could not effectively disrupt adoptive placements after the five-
day filing deadline. Essentially, L.B. 712 provided needed structure to
insure that these make-shift efforts would satisfy due process chal-
lenges. The procedures were designed to promote uniformity and con-
sistency so when performed correctly the adoptive placement would
not be subject to reversal in a later legal challenge.
As proposed and now codified in the various new subsections of 43-
104, a birth father still must challenge an adoptive placement within
five days of the child's birth. After a mother decides to place her child
for adoption, however, the agency or attorney must now make a good
faith effort to identify and locate the biological father and give him
notice.3 7 The heart of L.B. 712 is the procedure to notify an unwed
father of the pregnancy and pending adoption. Once this notification
is provided-either by certified mail or publication-a father must act
or be barred from contesting the adoption.
The new law also requires that a father who files an intent to claim
paternity be willing to take steps to pursue custody.38 An unwed fa-
ther who wishes to contest an adoption must do more than simply file
an objection, thereby forcing the birth mother to parent the child.
Rather than simply holding the adoption proceeding hostage by his
claim of paternity, the father must seek custody of his child. This pro-
vision is logical, as no purpose is served by allowing an unwed father
to prevent an adoptive placement simply by laying claim to his paren-
tal rights if he takes no further steps to fulfill the considerable respon-
sibilities of parenting. Under the reform of L.B. 712, a father must file
36. Id.
37. NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-104.08 (Reissue 1995 & Cum. Supp. 1996).
38. Id. § 43-104.02.
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suit to obtain custody within thirty days of filing his intent to claim
paternity or he will lose standing to object to the adoptive placement
of his child.39
According to the new version of the statute,40 a father has five
business days after the child's birth, or five business days after notice
is provided, whichever is later, in which to declare his intent to claim
paternity and obtain custody and to file with the Department of Social
Services (now known as the Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices).41 The previous statute allowed five days; the current version
counts five business days. This provision, while seemingly insignifi-
cant, could prevent the court from overturning an adoption when the
birth father has had insufficient opportunity to respond because the
birth or notification occurs over a weekend or holiday.
One of the unique provisions in L.B. 712 is its requirement that the
birth mother sign an affidavit, under oath, as the basis for her identifi-
cation of the putative biological father.42 This provision improves Ne-
braska adoption law by reducing the instances of false identification
by the mother. First, the father is much more likely to be identified
and thus notified because the mother could face a claim of peijury if
she knowingly falsifies information in the affidavit. Second, the affi-
davit provides a counseling vehicle for the birth mother's attorney or
agency representative to impress upon her the reason why accurate
identification of the birth father is crucial for the stability of the adop-
tive placement. Furthermore, any putative father who wishes to in-
sure that he receives notice of any child born of an out-of-wedlock
union can file an intent to claim paternity any time during the nine
months between conception and birth. Because only due diligence is
required, L.B. 712 does not guarantee that a birth father will receive
actual or constructive notice of the adoption. But, any birth father
concerned with receiving notice has the power in his own hands to
assure that he receives actual notice by filing in the putitive father
registry.
If only one biological father is identified, he is notified of the birth
(or expected birth), the impending adoption, and his right to relin-
quish paternity, deny paternity, or contest the adoption. If he con-
sents to the adoption or fails to avail himself of the statutory
procedures to contest the adoption, due process likely is satisfied and
the adoption should withstand any later challenge by the birth
father.4 3
39. Id. § 43-104.05.
40. Id. § 43-104.02.
41. Id.
42. Id. § 43-104.09.
43. Id. § 43-104.11.
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To satisfy the notice requirements in L.B. 712, the biological father
or possible biological fathers must be notified by certified mail.44 The
notice portion of the law takes a broad sweep at any and all potential
birth fathers of the child. While some may view these efforts as
"overkill," an adoption's validity is strengthened whenever all poten-
tial dissenters can be identified and their interests addressed at the
outset of the adoption process.
Section 43-104.13 requires that the father receive notice as soon as
possible to allow the greatest possible time for him to choose to claim
or relinquish his rights.45 The notice must (1) name the mother; (2)
state the impending birth date or actual birth date of the child; (3)
state that the mother intends to relinquish custody or join in the adop-
tion filed by her husband; (4) name the person identified as the possi-
ble biological father; (5) identify the rights and options that the
biological father may exercise; (6) identify who the potential father
must contact to exercise his rights; and (7) notify the biological father
of his responsibilities should he claim paternity.46
Cases in which the identity of the biological father is unknown or
undiscoverable do occur. These situations pose a serious threat to the
validity of adoptions because the father or potential father cannot be
notified if he is unknown. In an attempt to address such situations,
L.B. 712 requires publication when the identity of the birth father or
potential birth fathers is unknown or when his location cannot be as-
certained through reasonable efforts.4 7 The publicized notice provides
specific information concerning the father and the date and location of
the conception to provide the best opportunity for the actual father to
recognize that he is the person being notified.48 Further, the publica-
tion identifies the birth date or expected birth date, the pending adop-
tion, and similar rights and options as detailed in section 43-104.13.49
The publication requirement further illustrates that the purpose of
L.B. 712 is to address the due process rights of an unwed father at the
time of the adoptive placement to prevent future claims by a putative
father that can threaten the finality of the adoption and, conse-
quently, the child's best interests. Like the certified mail notice, publi-
cation imparts the two most crucial pieces of information that the
Shoecraft court held were necessary to preserve the validity of an
adoption: the fact of the pregnancy and the actual or expected date of
the child's birth. After receiving this information, the birth father has
the right to file his intent to claim paternity immediately, or if the
44. Id. § 43-104.12.
45. Id. § 43-104.13.
46. Id.
47. Id. § 43-104.14.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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child is not yet born, the man can wait a maximum of five business
days after the birth to file. Either way, any decision to act or fail to act
rests in the father's own hands and therefore is under his exclusive
control.
According to section 43-104.15, the procedures outlined above
should be conducted prior to the child's placement with the adoptive
family if at all possible.5O Yet, this section also provides an exception
to identification and notice if it would place the mother in physical
jeopardy, or if the conception resulted from sexual assault or incest.5 1
Attorneys and agencies must sign an affidavit detailing their efforts to
give actual or constructive notice to the putative father(s).52 This affi-
davit requires the attorney or agency to affirm the due diligence un-
dertaken to identify and provide notice to the biological father or
possible fathers.5 3 Also, all documents regarding notification to the
father or potential father must be attached to the final adoption
decree.54
If for some reason the court hearing the petition for adoption be-
lieves that due diligence has not been satisfied in identifying and noti-
fying the biological father, it may appoint a guardian ad litem to
identify and provide notice to the biological father.55 Thus, if the
steps taken to address the birth father's rights do not conform with
the statute's requirements, the court has the power to mandate that
those requirements be met before the adoption decree is entered. This
judicial action solidifies the resulting adoption, as the biological fa-
ther's rights are properly addressed by an objective party, rather than
a party involved in facilitating the adoptive placement. The specific
responsibilities and powers of the guardian are outlined in L.B. 712 to
insure the statutory procedures are followed.56
Section 43-104.22 illustrates that L.B. 712 was not designed as a
"pro-father" bill; rather, it is a "pro-child" effort. The reforms are
charged with minimally, but adequately, protecting a biological fa-
ther's rights so as to eliminate later legal challenges to the adoption.
This is not to say, however, that an unmarried birth father has the
unfettered right to object to an adoptive placement. Section 43-104.22
lists several circumstances under which a court shall determine that a
biological father is not entitled to veto an adoption of his putative
child.57 Circumstances that direct a court to disregard a biological fa-
ther's opposition to an adoption include the following: (1) the father
50. Id. § 43-104.15.
51. Id.
52. Id. § 43-104.16.
53. Id.
54. Id. § 43-104.17.
55. Id. § 43-104.18.
56. Id. § 43-104.18 to -21.
57. Id. § 43-104.22.
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abandoned or neglected the child after learning of the birth; (2) the
father is not a fit parent; (3) the father knew of the birth and failed to
offer any support to the mother or child; (4) the father abandoned the
mother during a known pregnancy and provided no support; (5) the
conception occurred as a result of nonconsensual intercourse or incest;
(6) the statute's procedures were followed, and the father failed to file
his intent to claim paternity and obtain custody by the end of the five-
day filing deadline; (7) the father failed to file a legal action to claim
paternity and custody within thirty days after filing his claim form
with Social Services; or (8) the putative father is not the biological
father.5 8
B. What L.B. 712 Did Not Do
The Legislature did not change or eliminate the five-day filing re-
quirement for a putative father to claim paternity and seek custody;
rather, L.B. 712 only slightly modified how those days are counted. In
Shoecraft, the court affirmed the validity of requiring a birth father to
act during the pregnancy or within five days of the birth, and the Leg-
islature apparently found no reason to change it. Additionally, L.B.
712 supported the reasoning of Shoecraft when it identified expedi-
ency as a legitimate basis upon which to design a statutory scheme
regarding unwed fathers' rights. Therefore, the only change in the
five day period stems from the point at which it begins to adequately
address a father's rights in cases in which he had an opportunity to
establish a relationship with his child, such as in the case of an "older
child." In these cases, the father may still file an intent to claim pater-
nity and obtain custody within five business days of notification of the
upcoming adoption. This change makes L.B. 712's provisions, as well
as its five-day rule, equally applicable to both an older child, like the
child in In re S.R.S., and a newborn, like the child in Shoecraft. As
such, L.B. 712 should remove the uncertainty and speculation inher-
ent in trying to decide, prospectively, whether a given case is a
"Shoecraft" case or an "S.R.S." case.
In addition, L.B. 712 took no steps to inhibit adoption, decrease the
incentives for adoption, or increase the likelihood of abortions. The
section of the statute requiring the birth mother to sign an affidavit of
identification regarding the birth father requires only that the birth
mother be truthful in her statements regarding the biological father's
identity. Requiring identification under oath enhances the accuracy of
notice, thus affording due process and increasing the stability of the
later adoption.
Finally, none of the requirements set forth in L.B. 712 should oper-
ate to burden agencies and attorneys representing birth parents and
58. Id.
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adoptive couples. The statute sets forth simple steps to insure that if
the father can be identified, he is notified; after he is notified, the fa-
ther has a sufficient, but limited period of time to step forward and act
like a father-taking on both the rights and responsibilities of a par-
ent. The steps required of the adoption practitioners include minimal
tasks such as securing the mother's affidavit, sending certified copies
of letters to potential fathers, and publishing information in the local
newspaper, if necessary. Many attorneys were already taking such
steps or substantial equivalents before L.B. 712 was passed. Consid-
ering what the parties to an adoption must endure if an adoption is
later contested by a surprise appearance by the biological father, the
minimal steps taken early, even if a slight additional burden, save
great expense, trauma, and effort later.
IV. NOTABLE DECISIONS SINCE ENACTMENT OF L.B. 712
In 1995, the United States Supreme Court, in O'Connell v. Kirch-
ner,59 again ruled on issues affecting biological fathers' rights. In
O'Connell, the child was four years old and had lived with his adoptive
parents since birth. For the first two months of the child's life, the
child's biological father was told that his son was dead. Immediately
upon finding the boy alive, the father asserted his rights. According to
the lower court, he was a fit parent and adequately pursued his rights.
Consequently, the lower court reversed the adoption decree and
awarded the biological father immediate custody.
The O'Connell Court expressed regret that the Illinois court had
entered an erroneous adoption decree in 1992, and that the delay in
correcting the error had such unfortunate effects. Nonetheless, the
Court affirmed reversal of the adoption decree.6O O'Connell illustrates
the point that faulty effort prior to or during the adoption process can
and will cause future heartache and tragedy.
The Nebraska Supreme Court also ruled on two adoption cases in-
volving unwed fathers' rights since the Legislature passed L.B. 712,
but these two cases came to fruition before the new statute took effect.
Consequently, the cases were decided under the old statute.61 None-
theless, these cases are helpful in predicting the Nebraska Supreme
Court's likely response to L.B. 712 if challenged in the future.
First, in In re Adoption ofKassandra B.,62 the father lived with the
mother and his children for some time and periodically provided finan-
cial support. After the mother and father separated, the father pro-
59. 513 U.S. 1138 (1995).
60. Id.
61. See Friehe v. Schaad, 249 Neb. 825, 545 N.W.2d 740 (1996); In re Adoption of
Kassandra B., 248 Neb. 912, 540 N.W.2d 554 (1995).
62. 248 Neb. 912, 920, 540 N.W.2d 554, 559 (1995).
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vided little financial support, but did keep in contact with his children.
The mother eventually placed the children with an adoption agency,
lying about the identity of their father. When the father learned of the
placement and pending adoption, he filed a motion to claim paternity.
The court held that the plain language of the pre-L.B. 712 statute
requiring the consent or substitute consent of both living parents to be
attached to an adoption decree meant that the adoptive family's fail-
ure to secure the father's or a substitute's consent constituted a proce-
dural failure.6 3 Kassandra concluded that the county court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction and reversed the order terminating the fa-
ther's parental rights. The court addressed the five-day notice issue
only to the extent that it previously had stated that it was not applica-
ble to a father whose child was not a newborn, if he had established a
relationship with the child and provided support. 64 If anything, Kas-
sandra further evidenced the need to replace the law as it existed
prior to L.B. 712.65
Four months later, the court decided Friehe v. Schaad.66 In
Friehe, the mother called the father one day after birth to inform him
of the child's existence; the mother stated that she was unaware of her
pregnancy until the day of the birth. Upon visiting the mother's par-
ents and then the mother, the father learned the mother was consider-
ing adoption, but she expressed a desire for it to be a joint decision.
The father failed to claim paternity within the five-day filing period,
but informed the mother that he wished to keep the child. The
mother, however, continued to insist on an adoption.
The court began its analysis noting that no established relation-
ship existed between the child and father.6 7 The court went on to ana-
lyze not the constitutionality of terminating an established bond, but
the termination of an opportunity to form one. 68 According to Friehe,
the state has a compelling governmental objective in insuring the
well-being and proper care and nurture of all children.6 9 Conse-
quently, the state may treat mothers and fathers differently because
63. Id.
64. Id. at 921-22, 540 N.W.2d at 560 (citing In re S.R.S., 255 Neb. 759, 408 N.W.2d
272 (1987)).
65. As this Article goes to press, L.B. 1041 was introduced by Senator Gerald Matzke
and was passed by the Nebraska Legislature in April 1998. The Bill rectifies the
issues raised in In re Adoption ofKassandra B., 248 Neb. 912, 540 N.W.2d 554
(1995). Specifically, L.B. 1041 clarified that (1) consents to adoption need be filed
only prior to the hearing on the adoption (not attached to the petition); (2) the
necessity of an unwed father's consent is governed exclusively by the subsections
of 43-104; and (3) if a birth father's consent is not required for any reason under
§ 43-104.22, a substitute consent for him does not need to be obtained.
66. Friehe v. Schaad, 249 Neb. 825, 545 N.W.2d 740 (1996).
67. Id. at 833, 545 N.W.2d at 746.
68. Id. at 833-34, 545 N.W.2d at 746-47.
69. Id. at 834, 545 N.W.2d at 747.
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the statute, including the five-day filing period, supports such a state
interest.70 Further, "it is in the best interests of the child to allow the
transfer to a loving adoptive family as soon as possible after birth."'71
Because the father immediately knew of the birth and the mother's
intentions regarding adoption, and because the five-day filing period
was constitutional, the father could not prevent the adoption. Only
the father's own ignorance of the law had prevented him from protect-
ing his parental rights. 72
Friehe represents the only likely scenario in which the former law
would seem to function properly. The five-day notice was held valid
because the father had notice of the birth and imminent adoption dur-
ing the five days after the birth. Similar to the court's reasoning in
Friehe, L.B. 712 places primary responsibility for protecting an unwed
father's rights into his own hands. This occurs when the man (or men)
identified as the putative father is provided actual or constructive no-
tice of the expected or actual birth of the child and the impending
adoption plan, and is given a set, but limited, time in which to either
act or lose any rights he might have to the child. In this way, the
father's rights are sufficiently protected to make the adoption resis-
tant to any later claims. Once the father's rights have been addressed
by those acting in furtherance of the adoption through the reasonable
efforts of due diligence, not under a standard of perfection, only the
father can be blamed if he fails to act in time to secure his parental
rights either after receiving notice or by exercising his right to file in
the putative father registry any time after his child is conceived.
V. CONCLUSION
In passing L.B. 712, the Nebraska Legislature improved adoption
law in two very important ways. After following the steps outlined in
the statute, an adoption is relatively impervious to challenges by an
unwed father who unexpectedly attempts to claim paternity rights to
a child with whom he has established no parent-child relationship.
The statute also clarifies the procedures to follow to effectuate a valid
and legally stable adoptive placement of an older child who may have
some degree of relationship or involvement with the birth father.
While on its face the statute seems to promote enhanced rights for
unwed fathers by adding notification procedures to the adoption pro-
cess, it does so only as a means to an end. By requiring minimal due
diligence in the early stages of an adoption, the validity of the entire
adoption improves. In this way, tragic cases like In re S.R.S. can be
avoided. The Nebraska Legislature wisely anticipated the language
70. Id.
71. Id. at 835, 545 N.W.2d at 747.
72. Id.
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in Friehe, which announced that nuturance, support, and loving care
of children is a paramount state interest. By adopting L.B. 712, the
Legislature did service to that endeavor.
